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INTRODUCTION
We consider how the market for child care services, child care vouchers, and 
welfare reforms affect the transition of welfare recipients from welfare to work. In 
particular, we are interested in identifying which factors encourage single mothers to 
move directly from welfare to work (i.e., to “work ﬁ  rst”) and which factors encourage 
single mothers to pursue schooling or job training options before entering the labor 
market (i.e., to “school ﬁ  rst”). The difference in these potential transition paths is 
important when considering economic self-sufﬁ  ciency. Being able to obtain a job is 
necessary to achieve self-sufﬁ  ciency, but accepting a low-wage, low-skill job in order 
to exit welfare quickly may not be the best route for the long term. Receiving further 
education or job retraining may be required before one can obtain a job that allows for 
self-sufﬁ  ciency. Although our data prevent us from observing the earnings of single 
mothers after they have made the transition from public assistance, we are able to 
analyze the effect child care vouchers and welfare reforms have on the decisions of 
single mothers when deciding to pursue work or education in preparation for exiting 
the welfare system.
As Blank [2002] points out, a major gap in the literature on welfare reform is 
the failure to consider how the availability, cost, and quality of child care as well 
as how early care and education policies affect the transition from welfare to work. 
While paucity of data usually prohibits measuring all three aspects of the child care 
market,1 our work starts to address these shortcomings by relying on data from child 
care resource and referral agencies.
Our work also extends the welfare reform literature by considering how the avail-
ability and funding of child care vouchers (the major child care policy implemented 
as part of welfare reform) and early childhood education programs (including Head 
Start) designed to care for and educate low-income children affect the transition from 
welfare. Our data also span the introduction of time limits, allowing us to comment 
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We use two data sets to examine the factors that lead eligible welfare recipients 
to use child care vouchers and what activity – work or schooling – is facilitated by the 
use of child care vouchers.2 To brieﬂ  y preview our results, we ﬁ  nd that the availability 
and quality of child care are positively related to transiting directly from welfare to 
work. Similarly, increased availability of both child care vouchers and Head Start and 
Pre-K programs are associated with an increased probability of making the transition 
from welfare directly to work. We also examine how work requirements and time limits 
inﬂ  uence the decision to work ﬁ  rst versus to school ﬁ  rst. The data reveal a pattern 
of behavior that is consistent with the incentives provided by Massachusetts’ “work 
ﬁ  rst” welfare reform coupled with its time limit regulation that favors schooling by 
mothers with infants. Speciﬁ  cally, those households with school-aged children are 
subject to both time limits and work requirements, and we ﬁ  nd they are most likely 
to work ﬁ  rst. In contrast, mothers with infants are subject to neither time limits nor 
the work requirement, and we ﬁ  nd this group is more likely to receive more education 
before seeking employment.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes Massachusetts’ 
welfare reforms. We introduce the data in the next section, and discuss our estimation 
strategy in the section following that. The subsequent section contains a discussion of 
the factors associated with eligible welfare mothers’ use of child care vouchers, while 
the section following that one presents results on the factors inﬂ  uencing the transi-
tion from welfare to work. We conclude with a discussion of our empirical results and 
their policy implications concerning child care, early care and education programs, 
and welfare reform.
MASSACHUSETTS’ WELFARE REFORM
In April of 1995, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts requested a welfare reform 
waiver from the federal government. Massachusetts’ proposal included job training, 
a work requirement, time limits, medical assistance, and centralization of the public 
assistance system. The waiver was granted in full except for time limits. Overseen by 
the newly formed Department of Transitional Assistance, these reforms were initi-
ated on November 1, 1995. As part of its welfare reform Massachusetts provided child 
care vouchers to welfare recipients that were working or participating in approved 
education or training. 
President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) the following August. PRWORA replaced the previous 
AFDC program with block grants from the federal government to the states, known 
as TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families). Although some restrictions were 
placed on the TANF block grants, states were given considerable leeway in setting 
eligibility requirements as well as the beneﬁ  t level. Two novel components of PRWORA 
were work requirements and time limits. Massachusetts met the work requirements 
of PRWORA, and, with its passage, was also able (and now required) to implement 
time limits. PRWORA also consolidated all child care funding into a block grant (the 
Child Care Development Fund) and substantially increased funding available for child 
care subsidies. As with TANF, states were granted considerable latitude to develop 
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In Massachusetts, anyone subject to the time limit is permitted to receive TAFDC 
(as the TANF program is called in Massachusetts) funds for a maximum of 24 months 
in any consecutive 60 months. Anyone subject to work requirements must be, within 
60 days of receiving TAFDC funds, actively involved in some type of work activity for 
at least 20 hours per week. If the person fails to ﬁ  nd a job, she is required to perform 
20 hours of community service per week. Although there are some other exceptions, 
the Massachusetts program is straightforward. A TAFDC recipient is exempt from the 
time limits and the work requirement if her youngest child is under the age of two. 
The clock on time limits starts ticking on the youngest child’s second birthday. The 
recipient remains exempt from the work requirement, however, until her youngest 
child turns six years-old and enters the ﬁ  rst grade. It is important to note that these 
are separate requirements. If one receives beneﬁ  ts while her youngest child is two and 
three, thus exhausting her time limits, the time limit deadline comes into effect and 
beneﬁ  ts are terminated even though the recipient would otherwise remain exempt 
from work for the next two years. Massachusetts’ welfare reforms, therefore, promote 
training and education for those with children under two years-old. Recipients with 
a youngest child at least two but not yet six years-old are exempt from work but are 
subject to time limits. Thus, they are allowed to pursue education/job training if they 
so choose, but this is possibly a risky proposition as they will not receive public as-
sistance monies after two years of support. Finally, households with a youngest child 
at least six years-old face a “work ﬁ  rst” welfare system, as these recipients are subject 
to both time limits and the work requirement. 
Massachusetts’ job training and education program, the Employment Services 
Program (ESP), is available for free to all TAFDC recipients. The ESP includes con-
tinuing a high school education, obtaining a GED, or even enrolling in a state-funded 
college for up to two years. While the ESP is available to all TAFDC clients, those 
subject to the work requirement must be working at least 20 hours a week. Thus, 
educational or training programs offered by the ESP must be attended in addition 
to working. Pursuing schooling (unlike job training or on-the-job training, which are 
less time intensive), therefore, becomes more difﬁ  cult once the individual faces the 
work requirement.
In addition to offering employment services, the Massachusetts Ofﬁ  ce of Child 
Care Services also offers vouchers to purchase formal or informal child care to anyone 
receiving TAFDC monies and participating in approved activities (e.g., work, school-
ing, actively seeking employment, job training). The state-legislated reimbursement 
rate varies by age of the child, the type of care, location, and the amount of child care 
provided. The Massachusetts state legislature has limited the amount of regional 
variation in reimbursement rates for political reasons. This means that vouchers are 
more attractive to providers in locations with lower market prices (e.g., the western 
part of Massachusetts) and are less attractive to providers in areas with higher market 
prices (e.g., Boston). Thus, higher market prices are associated with lower availability 
of child care for families wishing to use a voucher. 
Former TAFDC recipients are also provided with child care vouchers for a year 
after they leave TAFDC if they earn less than 75 percent of the state median income. 
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purchased with their voucher. In practice, Massachusetts provides vouchers to former 
TAFDC recipients as long as they are working and remain income-eligible.
Having access to a voucher, however, does not always lead one to use the voucher. 
Some mothers will not be able to ﬁ  nd a provider who accepts the voucher – only about 
forty percent of group facilities accept vouchers. Others may not be able to ﬁ  nd care 
during the hours they need or for the age of their child. Others may gain access to free 
child care such as with Head Start or a Community Partnership for Children (Mas-
sachusetts Pre-K program). Finally, some voucher-eligible mothers may be unaware 
of the program and therefore fail to apply for a voucher.
DATA
We use two data sets for our work. These data sets allows us to examine both 
the factors that lead eligible welfare recipients to use child care vouchers and how 
welfare recipients use child care vouchers to foster work or schooling. One data set, 
which we call the TAFDC/OCCS data set, comes from the Massachusetts Ofﬁ  ce of 
Child Care Services (OCCS) and contains information from monthly interviews on over 
three thousand current and former TAFDC recipients who used a child care voucher 
between July 1996 and August 1997. The other data set, which we call the DOR data 
set as it was provided by the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (DOR), is a 20 
percent random sample of child care voucher-eligible, single mothers who received 
public assistance in 1997.
The TAFDC/OCCS Data Set
We combined data from several state agencies in Massachusetts to create the 
TAFDC/OCCS data set. We began with the OCCS monthly billing ﬁ  les for child care 
vouchers from the ﬁ  ve largest child care resource and referral agencies (CCR&Rs) 
in Massachusetts from July 1996 through August 1997. We match these data to the 
monthly ﬁ  les of the Department of Transitional Assistance (DTA) which tracks those 
enrolled in Massachusetts’ Employment Services Program. Merging these data pro-
duces a longitudinal data set containing 14 months of data. We add to this individual 
data, information on local child care programs,3 welfare policies, labor market condi-
tions, and other economic factors that vary either by geographic region and/or time. 
While not perfect, we believe these data more effectively capture local labor and child 
care markets than most previous studies. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the 
20,704 monthly observations of 2,881 single mothers who hold at most a high school 
education in the TAFDC/OCCS data set.
We restrict the sample to single mothers with at most a high school degree to 
focus on a sample of households that face similar labor market conditions. Almost 55 
percent of our voucher recipients worked during the previous week.4 Of our 20,704 
monthly observations, almost 70 percent come from households that remain in our 
sample from the month we ﬁ  rst see them through the end of our sample period, and 
almost 90 percent come from households that remain in our sample until at least June, 
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sample comes from households that start using vouchers, not from households that 
stop. Reasons for leaving the sample, however, could be many, including moving out 
of the sample area, getting married, or a change in one’s work hours or schedule (e.g., 
to night work) that makes child care difﬁ  cult or impossible to schedule.
 TABLE  1
  Descriptive Statistics for the TAFDC/OCCS Data Set.
 Mean  Median  Std  Dev  Min  Max
Individual Characteristics      
Worked positive hours last week.  0.546  1  0.498  0  1
Age of mother.  28.4  27  7.1  15.7  56
Mother has no high school degree.  0.453  0  0.498  0  1
Mother has a high school degree or GED.  0.547  1  0.498  0  1
English is spoken in the household.  0.950  1  0.218  0  1
English is not spoken in the household.  0.050  0  0.218  0  1
Household race is black.  0.419  0  0.493  0  1
Household race is Hispanic  0.324  0  0.468  0  1
Household race is white, non-Hispanic.  0.257  0  0.437  0  1
Number of household dependents.  2.603  1  0.945  1  8
Child Care Market Characteristics        
Family care slots per 100 kids.  5.106  5.503  1.596  1.304  7.427
Group care slots per 100 kids by age of child.  6.553  6.655  4.214  0  24.743
State contracted slots per 100 kids.  1.445  1.667  0.502  0.034  2.675
Percent group centers NAEYC accredited.  0.167  0.164  0.141  0  1
Median weekly price of care by age group  80.44  71.36  27.62  45  225
Child Care Voucher System      
State daily reimbursement rate.  25.61  28.5  8.00  14  38
State & federal subsidy per poor child in $100.  4.466  4.34  0.285  4.34  5.11
Probability of using a voucher.  0.470  0.477  0.142  0.030  0.803
Probability of using a voucher after welfare reform.  0.337  0.398  0.245  0  0.798
Early Education Programs        
CPC funding per poor child in town.  5.088  3.523  3.348  0  53.126
Head Start exists in township.  0.426  0  0.494  0  1
Youngest child is school eligible.  0.258  0  0.437  0  1
Welfare Reform and Policy Variables      
Youngest child is under 2 years-old.  0.272  0  0.445  0  1
Youngest child is 2 to 5 years-old.  0.541  1  0.498  0  1
Youngest child is at least 6 years-old.  0.187  0  0.390  0  1
Time limits imposed on Dec. 1, 1996.  0.714  1  0.452  0  1
Time limits * youngest child is under 2.  0.183  0  0.387  0  1
Time limits * youngest child is 2 to 5.  0.391  0  0.488  0  1
Time limits * youngest child is over 5 years-old.  0.139  0  0.346  0  1
Time  trend.  8.185 9  3.870 1  14
Welfare ofﬁ  ce is consolidated.  0.400  0  0.490  0  1
October 1996 minimum wage increase.  0.849  1  0.358  0  1
Economic revitalization dollars per worker.  419  18.59  527  0  2,349
Labor Market and Community Characteristics      
Retail and service jobs per worker in town.  0.551  0.561  0.064  0.205  0.808
Average hourly wage of cashier in MSA.  6.699  7  0.346  6.2  7
DET Job Center exists in township.  0.546  1  0.498  0  1
Median household income in zip code.  26,446  25,440  6,377  13,721  70,928
Notes: There are 20,704 monthly observations for 2,881 single mothers with at most a high school degree. 
See the data appendix6 for a complete description of sources and the creation of variables.364 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 As seen in Table 1, the TAFDC/OCCS data set contains a rich set of individual 
characteristics, measures of the child care market (costs, quality and availability), 
measures reﬂ  ecting the policies and availability of early care and education (vouch-
ers, Pre-K and Head Start),5 characteristics of Massachusetts’ welfare program, and 
variables characterizing the local labor market. A complete description of the variables 
and data sources is available in the data appendix.6
The DOR Data Set
The Massachusetts’ Department of Revenue provided us with a twenty percent 
sample of welfare recipients in 1997 who were eligible for child care vouchers. The 
data provided to us, however, contained only a limited set of individual characteristics. 
After further limiting ourselves to single mothers with at most a high school educa-
tion who reside in one of the ﬁ  ve CCR&R service areas that the TAFDC/OCCS data 
come from, we are left with 6,626 voucher-eligible individuals.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the DOR data. Almost 37 percent of 
income-eligible mothers use a voucher. The age of the mother, the percent with a 
high school degree, and the number of dependents are roughly the same as in the 
TAFDC/OCCS data set. The most striking difference between the data sets is the ra-
cial composition. Although the percent of mothers who are black is roughly the same, 
the DOR data contains a much greater percentage of whites, while the TAFDC/OCCS 
data contains a much greater percentage of Hispanics.
 TABLE  2
  Descriptive Statistics for the DOR Data Set.
 Mean  Median  Std  Dev  Min  Max
Probability of using a voucher.  0.3679  0  0.4823  0  1
Age of mother.  29.0  28.5  6.7  16  50
Age of youngest child (in months).  63.3  58.8  42.2  0  156
Mother has no high school degree.  0.4337  0  0.4956  0  1
Mother has a high school degree or GED.  0.5231  1  0.4995  0  1
Household race is black.  0.3456  0  0.4756  0  1
Household race is Hispanic  0.1601  0  0.3668  0  1
Household race is white, non-Hispanic.  0.4943  0  0.5000  0  1
Number of household dependents.  2.0660  2  1.2053  1  10
Household resides in Boston.  0.3885  0  0.4842  0  1
Household resides in Boston MSA.  0.5278  1  0.4965  0  1
Source: Twenty percent random sample of assistance recipients in the ﬁ  ve Child Care Resource Agency 
areas that match the TAFDC/OCCS data set who were voucher-eligible in Massachusetts in 1997. As-
sembled by the Massachusetts’ Department of Revenue.
Notes: There are 6,626 observations.
ESTIMATION
How should the transition from welfare to work be estimated? Ideally, we would 
have a sample of voucher-eligible individuals, observe who was offered a voucher 
(and when), and then estimate a nested-logit model in which individuals ﬁ  rst choose 
whether to use a voucher and then choose whether to use the voucher for work or for 
schooling. Unfortunately, such a sample is not available.365 THE TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK
Rather, we follow a procedure put forth by Pagan [1984; 1986]. We begin by using 
the DOR data to estimate a Probit model of the probability that an eligible welfare 
recipient will use a child care voucher. The parameter estimates from the Probit 
estimation are then used to predict the probability that each welfare recipient in 
the TAFDC/OCCS data set would use a voucher. Finally, a ﬁ  xed-effects model of the 
probability that an individual in the TAFDC/OCCS data set will either be working 
or in school is estimated. The probability of using a voucher is controlled for during this 
second stage of estimation in order to account for the fact that the TAFDC/OCCS data set 
contains only families that use vouchers (i.e., to control for the sample selection issue).
There are two remaining estimation issues concerning the ﬁ  rst stage of the 
estimation. First, only variables that are common to both data sets can be included 
in the probability of voucher use model. This limits the voucher-use speciﬁ  cation. 
Second, exclusion restrictions are needed to identify the probability of voucher use 
equation from the probability of working versus schooling equation. While we could 
rely on functional form differences for identiﬁ  cation, the literature indicates that such 
identiﬁ  cation is questionable. Fortunately, we have access to a particularly attractive 
instrument – the local CCR&R agency designated to serve each family. Massachusetts’ 
CCR&R agencies administer the child care voucher program in their service area and 
help families ﬁ  nd appropriate child care. The CCR&Rs are very diverse – while some 
CCR&Rs are sophisticated and efﬁ  cient, others are far less so. Moreover, local Depart-
ment of Employment and Training ofﬁ  ces, not CCR&Rs, help welfare recipients ﬁ  nd 
employment and training/education opportunities. Thus, afﬁ  liation with a particular 
CCR&R will affect voucher use but will not affect one’s employment versus schooling 
decisions. This makes CCR&R afﬁ  liation an ideal instrument for identiﬁ  cation.
The next step in the estimation procedure is to include the predicted probability 
of voucher use (or the Mills ratio) when estimating a ﬁ  xed-effects logit model of the 
working versus schooling decision. The error term of the logit speciﬁ  cation that we 
estimate includes an individual ﬁ  xed-effect, a time ﬁ  xed-effect, and a random compo-
nent.7 In carrying out the estimation, we calculate robust standard errors to adjust 
for the heteroskedasticity imparted by the unbalanced panels of households, as we 
observe households for varying lengths of time as they enter and leave the child care 
voucher program.
Typically, when estimating how child care costs affect female labor supply, the 
sub-sample of working mothers is used to predict a wage and a cost of care for all 
mothers in the sample. Labor market participation is then estimated for the entire 
sample by including the predicted wage and price of child care for each mother.8 
Anderson and Levine [2000] and Hotz and Kilburn [1992], however, demonstrate 
that the results from this procedure are sensitive to the empirical speciﬁ  cation and 
exclusion restrictions.
We take a different approach. We limit consideration to single mothers with at 
most a high school degree so that the employment opportunities and potential wage 
offers faced by the mothers in our sample are likely to be similar. Moreover, the ex-
tent to which employment opportunities and wages differ across these individuals is 
likely to be due either to observed individual characteristics, to unobserved individual 
characteristics that will be captured by the ﬁ  xed-effects model, or to conditions in the 
local labor market. Thus, in lieu of estimating a wage for each mother, we include 
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or predicted child care costs paid by each mother, which is nothing for most mothers 
in our sample, we include the median cost of child care.9
RESULTS FOR THE PROBABILITY OF USING A CHILD CARE VOUCHER 
EQUATION
The probability of using a voucher equation is modeled as a Probit regression that 
includes age of the mother, age of the child, education, race, number of dependents, 
whether the mother lives in Boston and/or the Boston metropolitan area, and CCR&R 
agency. The regression results are reported in Table 3.
 TABLE  3
  Probability of Using a Voucher (Probit Regression)
 Coef.  St.  Error  p-value
Age of mother.  -0.0515  0.0219  0.019
Age of mother squared.  0.0003  0.0004  0.404
Age of youngest child (in months).  0.0130  0.0016  0.000
Age squared of youngest child (in months).  -0.0001  0.0000  0.000
Mother has no high school degree.  -0.3462  0.0347  0.000
Household race is black.  0.3427  0.0448  0.000
Household race is Hispanic  0.2640  0.0516  0.000
Number of household dependents.  0.0991  0.0152  0.000
Household resides in Boston.  0.0298  0.0914  0.744
Household resides in Boston MSA.  0.1159  0.1399  0.407
CCRA=Child Care Choices of Boston  0.1036  0.0953  0.277
CCRA=Child Care Search  0.3600  0.1462  0.014
CCRA=New England Farm Workers Council  0.5726  0.1471  0.000
CCRA=Child Care Works  0.5588  0.1455  0.000
Constant 0.1743  0.3398  0.608
    
Number of Observations  6,626   
Psuedo R-squared  0.0944   
Log-likelihood -3947   
Source: Twenty percent random sample of assistance recipients (Massachusetts Department of Revenue).
The CCRA omitted from the regression is the Child Care Resource Center.
We ﬁ  nd that voucher use increases with the age of the mother, and at an increas-
ing rate. Families with preschoolers are also more likely to use vouchers than families 
with only school-age children. Speciﬁ  cally, the probability that a family uses vouch-
ers increases with the age of the youngest child up to 65 months, after which age the 
probability of voucher use starts to decrease. More uneducated mothers are less likely 
to use a voucher, while blacks and Hispanics are more likely to use one. Voucher use 
increases as the number of children in the household increases. And the probability 
of voucher use varies substantially across CCR&Rs, as should be the case if CCR&Rs 
are valid instruments for identiﬁ  cation.
The parameter estimates in Table 3 are used to predict the probability of voucher 
use for each observation in the TAFDC/OCCS data set. The Mills ratio is also calculated 
for each observation in order to provide an alternative sample selection adjustment 
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RESULTS FOR THE WORK VERSUS SCHOOLING EQUATION
Table 4 reports the coefﬁ  cient estimates and t-statistics from a ﬁ  xed-effects logit 
model specifying the decision to use one’s voucher while working (dependent variable 
= 1) or while pursuing more schooling (dependent variable = 0). Model 1 includes the 
predicted probability of receiving a child care voucher, while Model 2 includes the Mills 
ratio. Because of the logit speciﬁ  cation, the point estimates give the direction of the 
impact of the explanatory variable, but do not provide estimates of the magnitude.10 
In order to make the magnitude of the predicted effects clearer, Table 5 reports the 
difference in the estimated probability of choosing to work over schooling under several 
different scenarios for a base-case individual.11
 TABLE  4
 Fixed-Effects Regression Results: Predicting the Probability of Working.
  Model 1  Model 2
   Coef.  t - stat   Coef.  t - stat
Family care slots per 100 kids.  -0.290**  -2.182  -0.293**  -2.204
Group care slots per 100 kids.  0.067***  3.040  0.070***  3.165
State contracted slots per 100 kids.  0.792***  3.668  0.801***  3.707
Percent group centers accredited.  1.364***  3.583  1.364***  3.580
Median weekly cost of care.  0.011***  3.174  0.011***  3.073
State daily reimbursement rate  0.044***  4.310  0.044***  4.350
State & federal subsidy per poor child.  0.531***  3.574  0.527***  3.548
Probability of using a voucher.  5.336***  3.495   
Probability of using a voucher after reform.  -0.099  -0.322   
Mills ratio      0.007  0.126
Mills ratio after reform.      -0.001  -0.057
CPC funding per poor child.  0.035*  1.935  0.036**  1.983
Head Start exists in township.  1.031**  2.065  1.053**  2.106
Youngest child is school eligible.  -0.015  -0.216  -0.002  -0.028
Youngest child is under 2 years-old.  -1.803***  -5.695  -1.911***  -6.064
Youngest child at least 2, not yet 6 yrs old.  -0.887***  -4.297  -0.876***  -4.230
Time limits imposed on Dec. 1, 1996.  -0.045  -0.246  -0.156  -1.211
Time limits * youngest child is under 2.  -0.161  -1.124  -0.054  -0.381
Time limits * youngest child is 2 to 6.  -0.200  -1.569  -0.131  -1.035
Time trend.  0.173***  14.420  0.170***  14.232
Welfare ofﬁ  ce is consolidated.  -2.459***  -3.600  -2.488***  -3.638
October 1996 minimum wage increase.  -0.235***  -3.247  -0.240***  -3.318
Economic revitalization dollars per worker.  3.8E-04**  2.372  3.7E-04**  2.338
Retail and service jobs per worker.  2.121  0.754  2.202  0.784
Average cashier hourly wage in MSA.  -1.714  -0.847  -1.338  -0.662
DET Job Center exists in township.  -1.011***  -3.031  -1.039***  -3.114
Median household income in zip code.  3.1E-05***  3.187  3.1E-05***  3.150
     
Number of observations.  20,704    20,704 
Number of families.  2,881    2,881 
Wald Test (chi-squared degrees of freedom)  1,587.4  (50)  1,574.9  (50)
Note: The dependent variable in each regression equals one if the mother is working and equals zero if 
she uses her voucher to pursue more schooling. Each regression also includes dummy variables for town-
ship, welfare ofﬁ  ce, Boston neighborhood, and metropolitan statistical area. Table 3 reports the estimated 
Probit regression results used to calculate the probability of voucher use and the Mills ratio. Statistical 
signiﬁ  cance is conveyed at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels with *, **, and *** respectively.368 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The availability, quality, and cost of child care all are signiﬁ  cant predictors of 
choosing to “work ﬁ  rst.” Increasing the availability of group care from 10 to 15 slots per 
100 children is associated with increasing the probability of working by 7.8 percentage 
points. Increasing the percent of slots nationally accredited from ﬁ  fteen to twenty-ﬁ  ve 
percent increases the probability that a mother will choose work over schooling by 3.3 
percentage points. And increasing the median market price of care from $80 to $120 is 
associated with increasing the probability of working by 10 percentage points, though 
this effect is not statistically signiﬁ  cant for the base-case individual.12 
 TABLE  5
 Predicted Differences in the Probability of Working from Table 4 (Model 1).
Child Care Effects
  Group care capacity increases from 10 to 15 slots per 100 kids.  (predicted effect)  0.078**
  (t-statistic) 3.874
   NAEYC accredited group centers increases from 15% to 25%.  0.033**
  3.798
   Median cost of weekly care increases from $80 to $120.  0.100
  1.132
Voucher Effects
   State reimbursement rate increases from $27 to $36 per day.  0.092**
  6.878
   State & federal child care subsidy increases from $434 to $511 per poor child in township.  0.095**
     11.061
   Probability of using a voucher increases from 0.5 to 0.6.  0.121**
     27.211
Early Childhood Education Effects
   CPC funding increases from $40 to $50 per poor child.  0.087*
  2.253
   A local Head Start program exists.  0.213**
  2.652
   Youngest child is eligible for a schooling program and the program is in session.  -0.004
  -0.215
Welfare Reform Effects
   Youngest child is under 2 years-old compared to being 2 to 5 years-old.  -0.224**
     -2.800
   Youngest child is at least 6 years-old compared to being 2 to 5 years-old.  0.189**
  3.764
   Imposition of the time limit: 
                    When the youngest child is under 2 years-old.  -0.046
  -0.785
                    When the youngest child is 2 to 6 years-old.  -0.060
  -0.937
                    When the youngest child is at least 6 years-old.  -0.008
  -0.244
Note: Reported below the marginal effect for each change is the appropriate t-statistic.  Statistical signiﬁ  -
cance at the 1% level is conveyed by ** and at the 5% level is conveyed by *.  See footnote 10 for a descrip-
tion of the base-case individual.
Characteristics of the voucher system are also important. Increasing the state 
reimbursement rate from $27 to $36 per day (which indirectly increases the avail-
ability of voucher care) increases the probability of working by 8.7 percentage points. 
Increasing voucher funding from $434 to $511 per poor child is associated with moth-369 THE TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK
ers increasing their probability of working by 9.5 percentage points. These results are 
similar to results using data for Miami-Dade County in Florida [Queralt et al., 2000; 
Witte et al., 2000]. Finally, if the probability of using a voucher increases from 50 to 
60 percent, the probability of working over schooling increases by 12.1 percentage 
points. This may be indicative of the high value placed on vouchers by workers as 
they tend to need more hours of child care than those in schooling. Blau and Tekin 
[2003] and Meyers et al. [2002] also ﬁ  nd that an increased probability of receiving a 
voucher is strongly related to labor market activities.
Early childhood education opportunities also affect the decision to work ﬁ  rst. In-
creasing the local funding of Community Partnerships for Children (Massachusetts’ 
Pre-K program) from $40 to $50 per poor child increases the probability of working by 
8.7 percentage points. Working ﬁ  rst is also highly related to having a local Head Start 
program, with mothers being 21.3 percentage points more likely to choose work when 
a Head Start program exits in their town. A bit unexpectedly, having one’s youngest 
child age-eligible for a publicly provided schooling program (Head Start, kindergarten, 
or elementary school) appears to have little effect on the decision to work.
Some of our most important ﬁ  ndings concern the effect of time limits.13 Prior to 
time limits, mothers with children under the age of two are 22 percentage points 
more likely to enroll in education programs as compared to mothers with a youngest 
child at least two but not yet six years-old. In contrast, mothers whose youngest child 
is at least six years-old are 19 percentage points more likely to choose working over 
schooling than mothers with a youngest child at least two but not yet six years-old. 
The last three entries in Table 5 show that the imposition of time limits largely did 
not affect behavior regardless of the age of the youngest child.
These results are exactly what one would expect following the imposition of both 
work requirements and time limits. That is, under Massachusetts’ age-sensitive 
rules for time limits and the work requirement, one would expect that a mother who 
is exempt from both time limits and the work requirement (because her youngest 
child is under two years-old) would be more able to pursue education programs. At 
the other end of the spectrum, a mother with a youngest child at least six years-old 
would be more likely to choose employment as she is required to work within 60 days 
of receiving beneﬁ  ts.
There are at least three explanations why behavior before time limits were imposed 
matched anticipated behavior under time limits. First, work requirements were in 
place for our entire sample period. Thus, one interpretation of the results is that the 
decision to work is strongly affected by work requirements and more so the closer 
one gets to facing the requirement, but time limits change behavior very little. As 
most education/training programs, with the possible exception of pursuing a college 
degree, are of short duration, the decision to enroll in such a program could well be 
unaffected by a two-year limit on beneﬁ  ts. A second explanation rests with the tim-
ing of our sample. Because our data span only ﬁ  ve months preceding time limits, it is 
possible that welfare recipients could have anticipated this change and had already 
started to make decisions accordingly. Third, instead of being long-sighted (as sug-
gested by the second possibility), TAFDC recipients could be short-sighted, and have 
not yet responded to time limits as none of them in our sample have exhausted their 
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
To begin to ﬁ  ll a gap in the literature, we have estimated the effects the child care 
market, child care vouchers, early care and education programs, and welfare reforms 
policies have on the transition from welfare to work. Although we consistently ﬁ  nd 
that increased availability and quality of child care are positively related with the 
decision to work ﬁ  rst than to school ﬁ  rst, our most important ﬁ  ndings concern the 
voucher system and the design of welfare reform. 
Our results concerning the child care market and the voucher system are impor-
tant, in part, because of the tied-choices a single mother faces when trying to reduce 
her reliance on assistance. For example, a child care voucher may offer an opportunity 
to begin a regularly scheduled job or to obtain more job training, but it also requires 
ﬁ  nding someone to accept the voucher. If group care centers are more likely to accept 
vouchers, but are also more likely to require full-time care, the mother’s choice set 
may not be as diverse as it appears as she may have to utilize full-time care, transport 
her child to the group center, etc. in order to use her voucher. [Blau and Tekin, 2003; 
Connelly and Kimmel, 2003].
We ﬁ  nd that eligible welfare mothers are more likely to use child care vouchers 
if they are older and better educated, have a child not yet in kindergarten, have a 
larger family, and live in a large city. Moreover, increasing the probability of receiv-
ing a voucher and increased funding of vouchers are both strongly associated with 
the decision to transit off of welfare directly into work. Thus, child care vouchers are 
an important feature of work-based welfare reform, the success of which will require 
continuing to assist mothers in meeting their child care obligations. Unfortunately, 
the recent reauthorization of PRWORA increases funding for child care vouchers by 
only $200 million per year for 2006-2010, and states will only receive these additional 
funds if the states provide matching funds. Even if states fully match federal funds, 
however, the additional child care funds will not insure that child care funding keeps 
pace with inﬂ  ation and will be far less than CBO estimates suggest will be needed to 
allow mothers to meet the new work requirements [Greenberg and Parrott, 2006].14
In contrast to federal policy, many state and local policies currently have “Tiered 
Quality” programs that seek to improve the quality of child care.15 States are also 
increasing funding for their Pre-K programs and better integrating Pre-K programs 
with the child care voucher programs. Our results indicate that quality improve-
ments and greater funding for Pre-K will increase the likelihood of welfare mothers 
transitioning to work.
In addition to valuing child care, however, successful welfare reform must also 
focus on the quality of jobs and worker productivity. Thus, while welfare recipients 
are using expanded child care services to more aggressively pursue work, public policy 
should also be concerned with increasing human capital in low-wage workers in order 
to help them obtain higher paying jobs. Evidence from Rhode Island, for example, sug-
gests that increased training and education can lead to greater self-sufﬁ  ciency than 
a “work ﬁ  rst” welfare program [Witte and Queralt, 2003]. States wishing to pursue 
Rhode Island’s approach might consider making education/training a substitute for 
work for a period of time (e.g., two to four years). Unfortunately, such policies will 
be more difﬁ  cult to implement with the more strenuous work requirement under the 
recent PRWORA reauthorization [Greenberg and Parrot, 2006]371 THE TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK
Our results suggest that well-designed welfare reform can help to encourage long-
term self-sufﬁ  ciency. Massachusetts remains the only state in the Union to exempt 
mothers from the work requirement as long as their youngest child is under six years-
old. Our results suggest that this policy strongly encourages schooling by the mother. 
In fact, we observe a pattern of behavior in our data that exactly matches what one 
would expect under a system of time limits (applied to everyone without children under 
the age of two) and work requirements (applied to everyone without children under 
the age of six). Compared to mothers with a youngest child at least two years-old but 
not yet six years-old, we ﬁ  nd that mothers with children under two years in age are 
much more likely to pursue schooling options in place of working whereas mothers 
with a youngest child at least six years-old are more likely to choose to work. Thus, the 
design of welfare policy matters in how single mothers transit from welfare to work. 
Although federal work requirements appear to be successful in reducing caseloads, 
such work-based incentives may not be in the best interest of families if the goal is 
to achieve long-term self-sufﬁ  ciency. Policy reforms that encourage schooling and job 
training prior to work, such in Rhode Island, may be more likely to produce former 
welfare recipients who are more skilled, more highly paid, and less likely to return 
to welfare in the future.
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1.  See Anderson and Levine [2000] and Blau [2001] for reviews of the child care literature.  Connelly 
and Kimmel [2003] ﬁ  nd that increased child care costs have a large effect on welfare recipiency and 
a more mild negative effect on employment.  Walker [1991; 1992] provides discussions of the market 
for informal child care.
2.  Unfortunately, we are not able to investigate whether welfare recipients who opt for schooling or job 
training before working ultimately do better by receiving a higher wage.  Witte and Queralt [2003], 
using data from Rhode Island, ﬁ  nd that former welfare recipients who received additional schooling 
or job training before exiting welfare earned a higher wage on average and were less likely to require 
further public assistance in bad economic times.
3.  Although cost, quality, and availability of child care affect the decision to use these services, it is 
also likely that demand for services affects the supply.  If so, our reduced form model is incorrectly 
speciﬁ  ed.  This concern is somewhat mitigated as we focus only on the child care decisions of the very 
poor, whereas the supply of child care services responds to the demand of all households.  Also, our 
measures of availability are determined by the available slots in May of 1996, which predates our 
data by two months.  The extent to which demand by poor single mothers results in more high-quality 
providers or affects the median cost of care is less clear.372 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
4.  A mother is classiﬁ  ed as working if she worked positive hours the previous week, regardless of her 
participation in education/job training programs.  Of the 11,304 observations that report positive hours 
worked, 278 also participated in an education or job-training program.  Our results are not overly 
sensitive to how we code these observations.
5.  One measure of quality is the percent of group centers that are NAEYC accredited.  At ﬁ  rst, NAEYC 
accreditation may not seem to be a good measure of quality since such care is likely too expensive for 
voucher recipients.  This is not the case in Massachusetts, however, as many accredited providers 
participate in the child care voucher program.
6.  A data appendix is available on-line at http://campus.lakeforest.edu/~lemke/welfare_to_work_data_ap-
pendix.pdf.  The data appendix describes the data sources, variable creation and estimation procedures 
in more detail and reports all of the regression results.
7.  When using explanatory variables that are collected at “macro-levels,” such as zip code and township, 
criticisms concerning correlated behavior over time apply [Moulton, 1990].  We allow for a ﬂ  exible 
enough error term in a ﬁ  xed-effects setting to correct for this possible correlation.  See the data ap-
pendix6 for complete details.
8.  Michalopoulos et al. [1992] and Ribar [1995] stand out as two exceptions that undertake structural 
estimation.
9.  This approach is similar to that of Blau and Hagy [1998] and Blau and Robbins [1988].  Blau and Hagy 
take the price of care to be an average of the prices charged by different providers in the same city.   
Blau and Robins take the price of care to be the average price paid by the working women within the 
same SMSA or county.
10.  We have also estimated the model using a traditional and an unstructured covariance random-ef-
fects estimator.  Hausman tests suggest that the random effects models are mis-speciﬁ  ed in that 
the explanatory variables are correlated with the individual effects.  The random-effects results are 
presented in the data appendix.6
11.  The base case individual has a 50 percent chance of receiving a voucher.  Her youngest child is 
between 2 and 5 years-old.  Her local welfare ofﬁ  ce is not consolidated.  There is no job center.  Her 
neighborhood has 5 family care, 10 group care, and 2 state contracted slots available for every 100 
children.  The daily reimbursement rate is $27.  NAEYC accredits 15 percent of all group slots.  The 
median weekly price of child care is $80.  The state and federal child care subsidy per poor child is 
$434.  Time limits have yet to be imposed.  The local CPC budget is $50 per poor child.  There is no 
Head Start program.  And her youngest child is not age-eligible for any public school.
12.  This result seemingly runs counter to the literature (and intuition) which ﬁ  nds that increased cost 
of care is associated with decreased utilization.  The literature, however, generally uses data for 
random samples of families, not for current and former welfare recipients who are presently using 
child care vouchers.  Thus, one interpretation of our result, as it applies to former TAFDC recipients 
who continue to receive a voucher but must pay part of the cost of care, is that the increased cost of 
care leads to utilization of child care to foster working rather than to foster schooling.  But even this 
interpretation is too strong for current TAFDC recipients as they do not pay any of the cost.  The lo-
cal price of child care does not directly affect current TAFDC recipients as welfare recipients using a 
child care voucher in Massachusetts (and in most states) do not pay any part of the cost of child care.   
The local cost of care, however, might affect the supply of providers willing to accept a voucher.  (See 
the second section.)
13.  The debate over whether time limits affect welfare case loads remains unresolved.  Whereas Ziliak et 
al. [2000] ﬁ  nd that time limits have little effect, Grogger [2003, 2004] and Grogger and Michalopoulos 
[2003] ﬁ  nd strong negative effects when controlling for the age of the youngest child.
14.  Head Start appropriations for ﬁ  scal year 2006 are below actual expenditures for ﬁ  scal year 2005. 
Thus, Head Start will not be in a position to take up the slack left by the limited increase in funding 
for child care vouchers.  See http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/research/2006.htm.
15.  See http://nccic.org/poptopics/statetqs.pdf for a discussion of tiered quality strategies.  Also, our work 
does not address integrating the three major early care and education programs in the US, i.e., child 
care vouchers, Head Start and Pre-K.  Witte and Trowbridge [2005], however, suggest that integrating 
these programs will lead to efﬁ  ciencies that could allow more early care and education programs to be 
made available even within existing budgets.  Such an increased availability of care would certainly 
ease the transition from welfare to work. 373 THE TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK
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